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Voting behaviour and political party alignment in Africa's young multi-party regimeswhether democratic or hybrid -is an almost completely ignored research topic, although this is a classical field of political science. Voting behaviour is usually explained by sociostructural, socio-psychological, or rational choice models, at least for industrialised societies.
For African societies voting is explained predominantly by factors such as ethnicity, personal ties, and clientelism (Hyden and Leys 1972; Barkan 1979; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997 ; Van de Walle 2003; Mozzafar et al. 2003; Posner 2005 ). Elsewhere we have modified the social structural model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to argue that that ethnicity provides the basic social cleavage for voting behaviour and the formation of parties 1 A first draft of the paper was prepared for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, November 16-19, 2006, (Re) Thinking Africa and the World: Internal Reflections, External Responses'. The research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) which sponsored the research project 'Political Parties and Party Systems in Anglophone Africa -Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia'. In addition, I would like to thank Joanna Münkner and Julia Scheller who helped to compile parts of the statistics, and Sven Buth for administering and computing our survey data. Neo Simutanyi organised the survey team in Zambia, and without his knowledge, support and advice this study would look differently. I owe him a great deal. Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation and party systems (Erdmann and Weiland 2000; ). The all-inclusive relevance of ethnicity for an understanding of African politics, in general, has been emphasised in a recent collection on ethnicity and democracy in Africa (Berman et al. 2004 ).
The claim that ethnicity is a major factor for voting behaviour is usually inferred from election results. Citizens of specific districts or regions which are populated (predominantly) by a particular ethnic group vote for one party one election after the other. Often this is also related to a general local wisdom that claims a close relationship between a particular party and ethnic group, for example, being a 'Tonga-party' in Zambia or an 'Akan-party' in Ghana. No doubt this kind of inference might entail an ecological fallacy. While aggregate data of the national level strongly support this link, individual voters might not have been motivated by ethnicity but by a different rationale. Staffan Lindberg and Minion K.C. Morrison (2007) have recently pointed to this possibility and challenged the 'conventional wisdom' about the African voter. Based on interviews in Ghana, in which interviewees explained why they voted for a particular candidate, they conclude that 'clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor features of the Ghanaian electorate ' (2007: 34) . It should be noted that nobody is suggesting that ethnicity is the only factor that explains partisan alignment in Africa, but it is the predominant social cleavage (Erdmann 2004: 70-73) or one important factor structuring voting behaviour (Nugent 2004) . It has been emphasised that there is no clear-cut pattern of how ethnicity affects party formation (Erdmann 2004: 71) .
The second problem is that there is hardly any research on political party affiliation (membership) in Africa. Only Michael Bratton and his colleagues (Bratton et al. 2005 ) used the concept of party identification in the Afrobarometer. They use party identification as a measure for the linkage of political parties to the mass public. They used the question ('feeling close to a political party') primarily to find out about party affiliation as an independent variable to explain institutional influences on attitudes towards reform politics. However, they also claim on the basis of their survey results that new political parties are not 'forming primarily along ethnic lines'. Although they do not deny that 'ethnic identities and grievances constitute an important basis of party affiliation', they 'suspect' that 'parties are forming along more pluralistic lines' (Bratton et al. 2005: 257) .
Based on an opinion survey in Zambia we want to find out what might explain partisan alignment and party affiliation in competitive African multi-party regimes. Our major focus will be on ethnicity as a socio-structural factor. Socio-structural factors are thought to explain long term determinants of partisan alignment. I will ignore the short-term factors that influence electoral decisions. Party affiliation identified through party identification and party membership is a better indicator of partisanship and should give more precise information about the basis of party formation.
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In the first section we explain our theoretical approach in terms of various models of voting behaviour. This will also include a discussion of ethnicity as an evaluative or non-evaluative dimension of voting -or, put differently, as a non-rational vis á vis rational evaluative behaviour. In the second section we discuss the particularities of the Zambian party system in relation to ethnic groups and voting behaviour. In the third section we turn to a description of our survey material and the problems involved before we present the analysis of our data in the forth section. In the conclusion we discuss the wider implications of our findings for further research.
Voter Alignment and Ethnicity
Many political scientists believe that voting behaviour and partisanship is such a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single model (Roth 1998: 23) . There are three classical approaches to the problem, the sociological (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) , party identification (Campbell et al. 1954; 1960) and the rational choice model (Downs 1957; Key 1966; Fiorina 1981 ).
According to the party identification model, voter alignment is shaped by the perception of three factors: candidates, issues, and links between parties and social groups. However, the latter factor, the social dimension is conceptually not well elaborated. Party identification is loosely understood as a socio-psychological product of family and social group ties, and the focus of the model is on the functions of party identification (Dalton 2001: 20-21 (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981) who judges retrospectively on the past performance of government.
This modified model takes for granted that voters identify with parties. The major difference to the party identification model is, however, that the identification is determined by rational calculation or reflection and not by affective ties which are crucial for the party identification model.
Finally, the cleavage model of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) provides the backbone for the two other models. According to research on voter alignment in Europe, the socio-structural model is still the best for explaining party alignment for most of the electorate despite increasing voter de-alignment. This applies even to highly mobile societies such as post-war West Germany where socio-structural determinants such as capital/labour and religion/no-religion are still the most reliable explanans (Roth 1998: 32) .
To sum up, the rational choice model helps to explain why some citizens change their vote.
The party identification model provides an understanding why many citizens do not change their vote, and the sociological model explains why people identify with particular parties in a number of elections (often undisturbed by the government's performance).
The question, then, is what is the crucial cleavage for voter alignment in Africa? The cleavage model was constructed on the historical experience of party formation and voter alignment in Western Europe. It comprises an analytical framework which combines a structural with an actor oriented approach. The cleavage denotes an institutionalised political conflict that is anchored in a society's social structure. This conflict is comprised of at least four dimensions: socio-economic, an interest or value orientated dimension, a party political dimension, and a dimension of voter alignments. The traditional cleavages in Europe were centre vs. periphery (nation state), church (or religion) vs. state (secularisation), ruralagrarian vs. urban-trade (primary vs. secondary economy), and finally capital vs. labour as a consequence of the industrial revolution. All four cleavages were articulated in the politics of western European states, and they were held to occur in a historical sequence as indicated above.
As has been argued elsewhere, most of the traditional European social conflicts can be identified in Africa as well, but they are weakly developed and contribute little or in a few cases only to the formation of parties and party alignment (Erdmann and Weiland 2001: 253-257 (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) . But not all politicised social cleavages are necessarily transformed into party formation as the politicization can, for instance, 'stop' at level of a social movement. As regards the development of an ethnic cleavage, Mozzafar et al. (2003: 382) describe this evolution in a three-step process: the 'construction' of an ethnic identity, its 'politicisation', and finally 'particization', a term borrowed from Gary Cox (1997: 26) .
Pure ethnic parties -parties supported by the electorate of one ethnic group only -are the exception rather than the rule in Africa. The rule is the ethnic congress party which is also ethnicity based, but formed by an elite coalition of two or more ethnic groups (Erdmann 'commitment to the locality and its dominant culture: you vote with your community and its leaders irrespective of your economic position' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 13 Ethnopolitical identities and ethnopolitical (or ethnic) voting is not a non-rational, merely affective or 'predisposed' behaviour as suggested by Lindberg and Morrison (2007) . 4 Ethnopolitical voting has also a rational dimension. In a situation of uncertainty it is rational to rely on things one knows -first, on the smaller and then on the extended family, on personal friends, neighbours, villagers, people from the next village, from the district, from the same ethnic sub-group, the same ethnic group etc. Although family or village ties are not always friendly, in case of an unknown 'challenge' posed from outside, the alliance and reliance on the next comes down to a decision to 'rely on the devil we know' -as villagers often explain their voting in favour of a particular party. The electoral decision for a candidate from the same village or the same ethno-political group becomes even more rational if the prevailing perception is that members of the other group will vote for a member of their group. The implicit assumption is that the elected person will, in the first instance, take care of his own kin before of any other; the elected might do that from his own will, but as everybody knows, he or she will also come under direct pressure from his own kin to serve them at first. In this sense ethnic or ethno-political identities are the basis of strategic choices for partisanship and voting decisions. As Dan Posner (2005: 91) puts it: 'it is the information that ethnicity is assumed to convey about likely patterns of patronage distribution -not atavism or tradition -that explains why it plays such an important role.' 4 Lindberg and Morrison distinguish between 'evaluative' and 'non-evaluative' voting behaviour; the later is based on clientelism, on personal affective ties of patronage, family, or service, and on 'proxy voting' which implies the prevalence of family, clan and 'ethnically predisposed voting ' (2007: 5, 9, 33) . It is not at all clear why, for example, especially voting influenced by patronage or the provision of service is not considered to be evaluative.
While Lindberg and Morrison found that the voters evaluative behaviour is related to the actual or expected performance of the candidates, the 'conventional' ethnic proposition is that candidates do not bother very much about the candidate, all that is important is whether a party is 'identified with the voter's own ethnic group, no matter who the individual candidates happen to be' (Horowitz 1985: 319-20) . At that time other scholar took a kind of middle way (Hyden and Leys 1972; Barkan 1979) , and related to elections in single-party regimes where only candidates could compete: 'All the constituency reports without exception emphasised the priority accorded by voters to the candidates tribe (in urban areas) and clans (in rural areas). Ascriptive group membership was still seen by nearly all voters as the sine qua non of acceptability and trustworthiness. Subject to this criterion the next test to be applied to a candidate was his probable performance in securing government services for the constituency' (Hyden and Leys 1972: 401) . Joel D. Barkan (1979: 84) argued similarly: the first criteria is ethnic belonging, the second expected performance of the candidates. Without discussing the rationale of ethnic voting they bring in an evaluative dimension when it comes to the second criterion for the voters' decision which is not directed by abstract universal issues but by a 'pork-barrel' orientation.
Ethnicity, Party System and Voter Alignment in Zambia
Numerous authors have identified ethnicity as one crucial dimension of Zambian politics (Molteno 1974; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996; Osei-Howedie 1998; Burnell 2001: 249-50; 2005: 113-115; Posner 2005) . Others however, have discussed the evolution and development of the Zambian party system without any reference to ethnicity (Rakner and Svåsand 2004) .
Usually more than 70 ethnic groups are accounted for in Zambia. According to Africa South of Sahara (2004 Sahara ( : 1195 the number is 73 and according to Morrison (1989: 702) it is 72. Officially there are seven language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi (Barotse), Kaonde, Lunda und Luvale; in the daily political discourse they are referred to as Bemba-, Nyanjaspeakers etc. During the 1960s and 1970s at least the Bemba-, Tonga-, Lozi-and Nyanjaspeakers were discerned as political identities -at least at the elite level (Molteno 1974 ).
Daniel Posner (2005: 232-41) used, apart from tribal identities, these four language groups together with the 'Northwestern' (Lunda-Luvale speakers) as the major units in his analysis of ethnic voting. Nowadays all the seven language groups can be considered as important ethno-political identities, but there are probably even more. One example is the Mwambespeakers whose politicians are striving for a separate North-Eastern Province, distinct from the Bemba-proper dominated Northern Province. This is complicated by the fact that The smaller opposition parties had their electoral basis in the southern and western parts of the country, the African National Congress (ANC, 1951 (ANC, -1972 among the Tonga-speakers (Southern Province), the United Party (UP, 1966-68) among the Lozi of Western Province, which after the ban of UP were united in an alliance of Lozi-and Tonga-speakers for the elections of 1968. Table 2 identifies the provincial strongholds of the ANC and UNIP.
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Another example are the Tumbuka and Nsenga of Eastern Province. From outside the province they are termed as Nyanja-speakers; however, inside the province they are considered to be different from the Nyanja-speakers constituting a group of their own. However, the ethnic party alignment was not at all straightforward. As indicated above, Tonga-and Lozi-speakers were also among the membership of UNIP. During the party elections in 1967 the two major contending groupings were based on the following ethnoregional alliances or coalitions: Bemba-Tonga-speakers (North-South alliance) against LoziNyanja-speakers (West-East alliance). The party elections resulted in members of the Lozigrouping to leave UNIP and to join UP. After re-democratisation in 1991 the Zambian polity re-emerged as a dominant party system for two elections (table 3) , but ended as a non-dominant party system after the third elections. Already in 1996 the political parties showed a substantial degree of volatility which As a newcomer, the UNDP was able to mobilise voters especially in three provinces of the Southern and Western parts of the country where the party's voter share was above the national average of the party. The exceptional strength in the South as well as its Tonga-leader explains partly why the party became known as a 'Tonga-party'. The regional pattern also applies to UNIP which dominated the East. But the party was referred to with a provincial label (Eastern Province party) rather than an ethnic label, because the Nyanja-speakers of the 6
For an analysis of factionalism in the Zambian party system and its effects see Erdmann and Simutanyi (2006, forthcoming None of the parties mentioned was based on a single ethnic group or tried to find the support of only one ethno-political group by mobilising explicitly a particular ethnic sentiment.
As can be seen in table 5, all major political parties represented in parliament made an effort to present candidates in almost all constituencies in the country for the 2001 parliamentary elections -at least for UPND, UNIP, FDD and even ZRP, given that particularly the latter two, as well as some others were formed only a few months before the election date. A closer inspection of the party strongholds reveals that only a few constituencies had clear majorities. In 2001, little more than a quarter of the 150 constituencies (39), had majorities of more than 50% for the winning candidate (table 6). The parties concerned were MMD and UPND. In fact, they won most of these constituencies in the heartland of the ethnic group they were identified with -the MMD, above all, in the Bemba-speaking districts of Luapula where the party won in 9 out of the 14 constituencies with more than 50%, and even in three with more than 60%. The UPND strongholds in the Tonga-speaking areas were even stronger; the party won three-quarter of the 19 seats in Southern Province with more than a 50% margin, and ten with more than 60%, topped by four with more than 70%.
Most of the constituencies were located not only in the Luapula and Southern Province, the Bemba-and Tonga-speakers heartland, but in rural areas as well. Even strongholds in Copperbelt and Central Province were rural constituencies. This strongly suggests that at least in those areas ethnic group voting took place. In Luapule the switch from MMD to PF can be mainly attributed to a split within the political elite of the Bemba; they were not voting for a different 'ethnic' party. On the opposition side, UPND in Alliance with UNIP and FDD lost some of its strongholds but seems to be clearly the only one of the three which maintained its strongholds in South- There is hardly any other explanation possible that some kind of group voting took place which is inspired by a different rational -but not government performance: Many Bembas stuck with the Bemba-led government because they believed that, at least, some of them would continue to benefit from the MMD-government dominated by their 'kin' (some did in fact) -while many Tongas could not see any further benefit from voting for a ruling party that does not improve their livelihood.
Up to here the argument is still based on inference from aggregated data and we still might be confronted with an ecological fallacy. However, the strongholds suggest that at least for some people, ethnic identity and ethnic rational is a factor that influences voting behaviour quite strongly. In addition, one should keep in mind that party formation and voter align- 
Partisanship: Survey Data
For the collection of individual data to find out why people align with a particular party, we conducted a survey among 1.001 Zambians aged 18 years and above in March 2004. Since we were not able to visit all provinces, the random sampling started at the provincial level (six out of nine), down to the district, the ward and finally to the official enumeration area of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), the Census Supervisory Area (CSA). The respondents were randomly selected within the CSA and randomly within a CSA. 7
The provincial and ethnic coverage was therefore limited to seven provinces. For each Province two to four districts were randomly selected and the number of interviews applied according to the relative size of the population. The same procedure was followed in the selection of the wards. If there were not sufficient CSAs in one ward to cover for only eight interviews in each CSA, additional wards were randomly selected. The number of CSA were established on the principle that no more than eight interviews should be conducted in one CSA; then the specific CSAs of the survey were selected. For the final selection of the household and the interviewee we applied procedures of the Afrobarometer.
Voter Alignment
According to the literature on voter alignment in Zambia the affiliation of a candidate is more important than his individual past or expected behaviour (Molteno and Scott 1974: 192; Posner 2005: 228-232) . There are exceptions of course, but members of parliament are usually elected on a party ticket. The parliamentary seat 'belongs' to the party; if a MP switches parties, he or she looses the seat and has to stand for a by-election. In pre-survey focus group discussions, the proposition that people vote for a party rather than a certain candidate was never challenged. 8 While the idea that a parliamentary seat belongs to a party was publicly under debate, the responses to our related survey question whether floorcrossing should be allowed without by-elections were very straight forward: Almost 75 per cent of the replies supported the current rule, and only 16 per cent said floor-crossing should be allowed. This very strongly supports the literature on Zambia, but also puts into question an approach which presupposes that voting decisions are based, above all, on candidates'
performance.
We also tried to get some information about the 'local' assessment of peoples' voting decision for one particular party. We, however, did not ask why someone voted for a party, but what they think why other people vote for a party. The idea was to avoid too personal a question which might come into conflict with the interviewees' perception of a socially 'unwanted' response.
In our focus group discussions almost all people in rural areas responded that other people voted in a 'tribal' way. In urban areas (Lusaka) the responses were different; urbanites said their peer's voting was program orientated, but in rural areas it was 'tribal'. 9
The responses seem to confirm Lindberg and Morrison's (2007) However, looking from a different perspective, the rational of programme and policy voting seems to be questionable -at least the respondents seem to contradict themselves. When asked whether they can see any differences between the parties as regards their policies and programmes towards various issues, only a minority of about a third or even less, depending on the issue, responded positively (table 9) . When asked further about the difference between the parties, less than a third maintained the difference was 'small' or 'very small'.
Only less than a quarter of the respondents thought that the difference between the political parties was 'big' or 'very big' in the following policies: education and health 22.7 per cent, privatisation and free market 15.7 per cent, and human rights 15.5 per cent. Moreover, when the respondents were asked about which party cares more or is more in support of one of these policies, more than half pointed to the ruling MMD (education & health = 50.5%, n = 380, and 19.2% of total; privatization and free market economy = 68.0%, n = 306, and 20.8% of total; human rights = 52.5%, n = 295, and 15.5% of total).
The results from our focus group discussions might provide an additional clue what this could imply. As in the survey, most of the participants could not detect any programme or policy difference between the various parties. And the few who said they could detect differences were, when directly challenged, almost all unable to name any difference: Only a few teachers pointed out (correctly) that during the 2001 elections campaign free primary education was a controversial issue, but only as regards the number of years which should be free. Other issues were not mentioned. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that all this does not give us a clear idea as to why people vote for a particular party. It only highlights the methodological issue whether this kind of approach can provide meaningful answers.
To find out whether the individual's ethnic identity has an influence on voting behaviour, a cross tabulation is applied with ethno-political identity as the independent and voting intention as the dependent variable. This is presented in table 10. Overall, no clear picture emerges from the result. No ethno-political group has a clear preference for one party, that is to say, more than half of the respondents of one particular group would vote for one party. Ignoring marginal difference below or above an average as well as smaller groups and parties, it is only the Tonga for UPND, the Nyanja and Lunda-Luvale for MMD that suggests a broader support for one party. Taking MMD and PF together would make a Bemba-vote of 40% which could end up at about 50% or more if a number of abstainers and 'don't knows', together 28% of Bembas, would vote in the expected way. The latter, however, is speculation.
Thus, the reason why the Bemba support for one particular party did not show up in the survey was simply a political split between two parties. To put it the other way, only 32% of the Bembas interviewed would vote for any other party such as UPND, UNIP, FDD or 'others'. As regards the problem of 'evaluative voting' as opposed to 'affective' voting the question remains as to why a substantial number of Bembas chose PF and not UPND as they were obviously dissatisfied with the performance of the MMD-government.
What seems to be much more surprising is that a substantial number of Tongas, about 38%, would have voted for MMD. Given the history of Southern Province as 'Tonga-land', its preferential voting for opposition parties, and since UPND was identified by its political adversaries as a 'Tonga-party' with numerous distinct strongholds in the province (table 4) This result is remarkable in several ways because it concerns the two most prominent and most articulated ethno-political blocs in Zambia -apart from the Lozi -and which, viewed from the public debate, are to be considered as the most 'particised' ethnicities. The first observation is that no party has the undivided loyalty of one ethno-political group. The second is that 'disloyalty' can go two ways: It can remain with one party which is considered the right ethnic party as well, hence the vote remains 'ethnic loyal' or it can shift to an other party which is associated with a different ethnicity. The latter voting is 'ethnic disloyal'. But it might be even more complicated, because there is also the possibility that people vote 'disloyal' for the party, but ethnic loyal for the right candidate -if the 'wrong' party runs the ethnically 'correct' candidate. The latter is more likely to happen among small ethnic groups which are not so closely associated with a particular party and where the political elite has a choice to affiliate with different political parties or alliances.
What is, to some degree, no surprise at all is a general observation that despite the identification of a party with a particular ethnic group, all the major parties are multi-ethnic in the support they get -hence they can be considered as ethnic congress parties. The different ethnic groups, however, re-appear with in the various parties as ethnic based factions (Erdmann and Simutanyi, forthcoming).
Party Identification and Party Membership
As indicated above, in order to get a better understanding of party alignment and of how the parties are linked with Zambian society, we applied the concept of party identification in our survey. Although there are some doubts, particularly in Western Europe, whether the 10 Aka Mbiskusita-Lewanika linked to the royal Barotse-clan, started as a founding member of MMD; after disagreeing with the non-reform policies of the first MMD government, he left MMD and was re-elected on a National Party ticket in his home area; again, when he fell-out with his NP-friends he became a founding member and leader of Agenda Zambia (AZ), and together with some other Lozi friends he was elected on this party ticket; AZ won substantial votes only in Western Province in Lozi areas. Later, he re-joined MMD. AZ was probably the only ethnic party in Zambia based on one ethnic group only. concept can be applied to other democratic polities, because it might lack some of its analytical power, it has been widely applied in other democratic systems (Dalton 2000; Harrop and Miller 1987: 131-145; Roth 1999: 41-47) and in Africa as well (Bratton at al 2005: 256-261 ). The idea is that party identification is an organising 'tool' for the perception, evaluation, and behaviour of citizens. Party identification does influence voting: 'This cue-giving function of partisanship is strongest for voting behaviour' (Dalton 2000: 21) .
The concept is also understood as a surrogate for party affiliation, since in the USA and elsewhere there has never been the kind of party membership that existed in Western (Dalton 2000: 25) .
Party identification among the different ethno-political groups is most widespread among the Lunda-Luvale (60%, n = 65) and the Tonga (55%, n = 240) and less among Bemba (45%, n = 188). Additionally more people in rural (53%) than in urban areas (40%) (Lusaka and Copperbelt) identify with a party. A comparison of the two most numerous groups of the sample the Tongas seem to be more 'particised' than the Bembas.
The cross tabulation of ethno-political group and political party identification reveals a pattern that is very similar to the voting intention (see table 11 ). Following the line of argument 27 from above, Bembas identify largely with the two 'Bemba parties', MMD and PF, together about 65%. Surprisingly, the Tonga almost evenly split their identification in almost equal parts between UPND and MMD. Ignoring the groups which turn up in small numbers only, the 66 per cent of Lozi and 57 of Nyanjas who identify with MMD seems to be remarkable.
In sum, apart from the Tonga, the concentration of a particular ethno-political group among party identifiers is clearly higher than among voters. This pattern of identification supports the assumption that most parties have at least a core ethno-political basis. The next step in the analysis is based on the presumption that party identification can be different from actual party affiliation. The major Zambian parties were selling (and/or distributing) party cards in the hundreds of thousands. From focus group discussions we learned that the question about party membership was understood in different ways. Some people said that they were members of a political party but never bought a membership card nor did they hold any. Hence, the general question about party membership came close to 'party identification'. We therefore asked additional questions about holding a membership card and of which party. Another problem is that some people keep membership cards of more than one party. 13
This problem also turned up in the survey when 344 respondents said they were members of a political party but only 287 held a membership card. This figure amounts to more than a 13 The reason seems to be opportunistic, but also protective as well. They might benefit from showing their cards at rallies if campaigners distribute 'presents', but it might also be helpful in contacts with state officials, since the administration is partly politicised as it used to be, probably much more, during the one-party regime of the second republic. Finally, we wanted to know which other social structural and also attitudinal factors, which are often thought to explain voting behaviour, might be statistically related to voting decisions in Zambia. As we only have a nominal dependent variable we can only use a logistical regression to test the ethnic hypothesis (table 13) . Voting for UPND is the dependent variable. The independent variables were the three ethnic identities (Bemba, Tonga and Lozi, reference group is 'all other'), the urban/rural divide, sex, employment (employed or unemployed/pensioner), age, education and religious affiliation (catholic, reference group is 'all other'. We also used an attitudinal variable, a democratic attitude index built from six items and scaled from 0 = 'no democratic/authoritarian attitude' to 6 = 'high democratic attitude' 14 .
The result of the applied backward stepwise logistic regression shows that the likelihood to vote for UPND is 4.5 times higher if somebody is a Tonga or 2.7 times higher if somebody is a Lozi as compared to other ethno-political groups. This, at least, supports the assumption that. compared with other social factors, ethnicity provides a major variable for explaining voting decisions for UPND. In addition, the stronger the democratic attitude and the higher the formal educational attainment of a person the more likely is a UPND vote. 
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that ethnicity matters for voter alignment and even more so for party affiliation in Zambia. Our individual survey data also suggest a number of reservations and qualifications which are partly methodology related.
Firstly, ethnicity or ethno-political identity is certainly not the only, but one factor that accounts for election outcomes. Perhaps, other factors might be more relevant than expected.
Ethnicity is clearly not a sufficient explicator for election outcomes but it plays its role. The survey data together with aggregate data of several election results suggest, particularly if we compare voting alignment, party identification and party affiliation (card holding membership), a core group of ethnic voters and ethnic party members.
Secondly, the degree of ethnic voting can differ from one ethno-political group to the other.
For some ethnic and ethno-political groups ethnicity appears to be more important than for others as an explicator for voter alignment and party affiliation. Usually this can be attributed to different degrees of ethnic mobilisation, up to 'particisation' of ethnicity, but, again, this needs an additional qualification which implies a methodological issue.
Smaller ethnic groups and some ethno-political subgroups do not identify with a particular party. Hence the political elite as well as the particular electorate can choose among different parties. Obviously, the elites disagree among themselves and affiliate with different parties;
and so does the electorate. These smaller groups seem to provide a substantial number of shifting voters (apart from urban areas, they are in Eastern, Northwestern and Western Province). All this makes it difficult to trace and analyse them in the various data collections.
But this does not imply automatically they do not vote and affiliate along ethnic lines.
Our survey did not cover the ethnicity of the local winning candidate and its party affiliation. So we could not control for voting in relation to the ethnicity of the candidate. As Posner's (2005: 224-228) analysis of aggregate data for a number of elections shows, the candidate's tribal affiliation matters as well, although the estimated difference between 'voters from dominant tribes' (0.63) and 'from non-dominant tribes' (0.52) voting for 'candidates from dominant tribes' is not very high. At least, this also suggests that ethnicity is not 'the only game in town', but still a crucial one.
In the end, taking the evidence of inferences from aggregate election data together with the survey data, one cannot escape the conclusion that certain reoccurring voting patterns cannot be explained by voters' decisions based on 'evaluative' assessment of individual candidates' performance. Taken together these findings imply that ethnicity can still be viewed as the major factor explaining party affiliation in Zambia, and to a lesser degree voter alignment. Ethnic affiliation and voting is not understood as 'traditional', non-rational or affective only but based on a strategically calculated choice.
A final methodological caveat remains to be stated, namely, that an approach based on selfevaluation of people -about the reason why they themselves or other people voted for a party or candidate -does yield questionable results. At least our survey yielded contradicting results. Moreover the assumption that voters relate their decision to candidates' performance does not hold true for Zambia; the party and its identification with a particular ethno-political group seems to be more important. As many other African countries have very similar electoral systems -single member plurality with party endorsement -it can safely be stated that this can be applied to other countries as well. This conclusion is also supported by John Carey and Matthew Shugart's (1995) finding that this particular electoral system is the most party-orientated type.
